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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM BAILEY STUMP,

)
)

Plaintiff and Appellant, )
)

vs.

)

Case No. 18036

)

BONETA LOU STUMP,

)
)

Defendant and Respondent.)
)

~~~~~~~~~~)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action for divorce in which there were contested
issues involving the division of marital assets and alimony.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After hearing the evidence offered by the respective parties, the Trial Court made a division of the assets and fixed
the amount of alimony to be awarded the defendant-wife.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent believes that the Decree of the Trial Court was
fair and equitable, and seeks to have the Decree affirmed on
appeal.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant were married to each other on
September 1, 1946, a period of some 35 years (R-66,82).

They

are the parents of four children, all of whom have reached
their legal majority (R-67,82).
(R-82,178).

They have two grandchildren

The husband is 59 years old (R-77) and the wife

is 55 years old (R-85).
The husband is employed in a top management position as
controller for Utah Copper Division of Kennecott Minerals Company.

He has been employed by Kennecott for 34 years, and has

been controller for 10 years (R-67,68).

He is the Chief Financial

Officer of the Company and describes his job as a very responsible
position (R-83).
Mr. Stump's gross salary at the time of trial was $62,000.00
per year or $5,166.67 per month (R-83,84).
include year end bonuses (R-84).

This figure does not

Bonuses are determined at the

end of the year and usually paid in February of the next year (R-85).
In 1981, Mr. Stump received a $10,000.00 bonus for the year 1980;
in 1980, he received a $6,000.00 bonus for 1979 (R-86).

He testi-

fied that it was "very doubtful" that he would receive a bonus
for 1981 (R-81); however, this self serving statement is inconsistent with his past history, at least for the prior two years.
In his 34 years at Kennecott, he has never experienced any
salary decrease.

Any change in salary has been an upward change
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(R-85).
In addition to his salary and bonuses, Mr. Stump receives
many fringe benefits from his employment.

These include a

liberal expense account that covers such things as club dues,
business travel, entertainment of out of town guests and local
travel in his own vehicle (R-87,163).

In connection with the

expense account, the Company advances $1,000.00 per month,
which he must then account for in expenses (R-165).

Additional

fringe benefits also include Company contributions to a savings
plan (R-115), health care and disability protection programs
(R-122), retirement benefits (R-121), and insurance benefits
(R-122).
The defendant-wife has made her career at home.

She has

not had outside employment during the period of the marriage
and in fact her husband has insisted that she not go
(R-79).

to work

Her plans over the course of the marriage have never

included a future employment (R-88).
time of the trial (R-179).
from her husband (R-180).

She was unemployed at the

She has no source of income except
Upon divorce, she will be deprived

of her husband's fringe benefits (R-123).

Her work experience

is limited to a job in a savings and loan company which she
held 35 years ago (R-89), and non-paying civic jobs which she
held in a small Arizona town (R-87).
training (R-179).

She has had no job

She has had no college or university training

except for a few recent non-vocational classes taken at the

- 3 -
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University of Utah (R-179).

Her inquiries into employment

opportunities have not met with any success (R-180).

She is

physically in good health (R-79), but had a mental breakdown
resulting from the divorce and was hospitalized for

3~

weeks

during part of the time that these proceedings were pending
(R~l90).

When she moved to Utah in 1980, she had no knowledge

that her husband intended to file for a divorce (R-183).

She

has since moved to Alameda, California in order to live near
her family and relatives (R-178).

She has no immediate plans

to work (R-179), but desires to enroll and receive some kind
of training at Alameda Community College (R-180).

Her long

range work plans are simply uncertain (R-180).
Plaintiff-husband acknowledges that over the period of
the marriage, defendant has been a good mother, kept a neat,
clean home, and has never been unfaithful to him (R-129).

The

only specific grounds for divorce are that ten years ago she
complained that "the kids were not doing their fair share";
that on occasion she would not go with him to the Elk's Club;
that she drank wine; and that on occasions fell asleep watching
TV instead of coming to bed with him (R-68,69,129).

On the

other hand, the plaintiff has been flagrantly unfaithful to
the defendant and has been openly living with a one Ellen Jensen
during the past year (R-109,129).

The evidence also showed

that plaintiff had been paying for a $500.00 per month apartment
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for himself, Ellen Jensen and her parents (R-132,133); that he
paid all of the utilities in addition to the rent (R-133); that
he has taken Ellen Jensen on expensive trips (R-134); that he
has bought her expensive presents (R-137,142,144); that he
bought a freezer and made large meat purchases from Ellen's
relatives to feed himself and her family (R-140); that he has
paid her medical and hospital expenses (R-146); and that he
has given her cash from time to time (R-145).
The amount spent by the plaintiff on Ellen Jensen, or otherwise unaccounted for, was in sharp dispute between the parties.
What was not in dispute, however, was the fact that although
the plaintiff had had a long history of high earnings, there
was a relative small marital estate available for distribution.
The trial court, after hearing all of the evidence, accepted
defendant's version of the facts and made the following finding
(R-46):
"The Court is convinced that plaintiff has dissipated assets for his own purposes and has generally made
no attempt to preserve the marital assets for distribution.

He has had control of substantial funds which he

has used at his discretion and has not sufficiently or
convincingly accounted for said funds.

These facts, to-

gether with the minimal liquid assets currently available for distribution, and the huge disparity in the
parties earning capacity (which will affect their

- 5 -
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respective ability to build up an estate sufficient
to provide support after retirement) require that most
of the assets be distributed to the defendant, and
that most of the debts separately incurred by plaintiff
(for which he received the consideration) go to him".
Based upon the above Finding, the Court proceeded to award
defendant a majority of assets and made the following allocation:
To the plaintiff
(a)

The cash in his checking account (approximately
$295.64).

(b)

All of the Paradox stock (worth approximately
$3,000.00).

(c)

His 1981 Pontiac automobile, subject to all indebtedness thereon.

(d)

The 1981 Kennecott Copper Corporation mortgage
differential (having a value of approximately
$316.80).

(e)

The State Farm homeowners rebate ($163.40).

(f)

The note receivable for the sale of his 1978
Chevrolet automobile (2,700.00).

(g)

The Bel-Style furniture leased by him.

(h)

One-half of the approximately $14,207.00 presently vested in the Kennecott savings plan at
the time it is distributed.
- 6 -
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(i)

All of the liabilities to the following named
creditors:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Girard Bank.
First Interstate Bank of Arizona.
Kennecott Copper - R.A.Y. Credit Union.
Kennecott Copper - CitiBank.
Gas credit card accounts.
Sears.
Ambassador Club.
Utilities owing at Casino Way.
Redman Van and Storage.
Montgomery Ward.
American Express.
J. C. Penney.

To the defendant
(a)

The Utah tax refund ($658.55).

(b)

The $20,997.81 cash in escrow from the sale of the
parties' residence.

(c)

The 50 shares of ASARCO stock ($2,031.25).

(d)

1977 Chrysler automobile.

(e)

Furniture and furnishings from home.

(f)

The paintings given to her in the course of the
marriage.

(g)

One-half of the approximately $14,207.00 presently vested in plaintiff's Kennecott savings
and investment plan at the time it is distributed.

In addition to the above, the Court awarded defendant alimony in the amount of $1,800.00 per month, one-half of the
vested benefits under plaintiff's retirement plan, and some life

- 7 -
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insurance benefits not in dispute (R-49).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS FAIR AND
EQUITABLE
It was the wife's position in this case that during the
period of the separation of the parties, there was a large
amount of cash under the control of the husband that was not
accounted for.
(R-46).

The trial court so found in its Finding No. 8

Thus, the award of property to the wife was not dis-

proportionate when an adjustment is made for the cash shortages.
Evidence of the cash shortages was follows:
According to the 1980 tax return, the parties had a
gross income in 1980 of $79,318. 74. 1
They paid federal and
state taxes of $20,787.11.

In September of 1980, the husband

started to pay to wife under an order for temporary support
(R-21) the condominium fees and mortgage (which according
to appellant's brief at page 3 was $840.00 per month), plus
$400.00 per month in cash, making a total of $1240.00 per month.
Prior to September, he provided her some support, but

1 The tax return is included as a part of the evidence but
apparently was not given an exhibit number. It was used and
referred to throughout the trial without objection (See e.g.
R-84).
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acknowledged that he never paid her anything in excess of what
was ordered under the temporary support order (R-104).

Giving

him the benefit of the doubt, and assuming that he paid his wife
$1240.00 for the entire year, the total expenditures on her behalf for 1980 would have been $14,880.00.
The husband's living expenses for the same period according to his own exhibit (Exhibit 1-P) was $18,192.00.

2

Thus,

for the year 1980, we summarize as follows:
Income

$79,319.84

Less:
Taxes

$20,787.11

Wife's living expenses

14,880.00

Husband's living
expenses

18,192.00

Unaccounted for in 1980

- 53,859.11
$25,460.73

For the year 1981 up to the date of trial (August 7, 1981),
the figures were as follows:
$36,166.69

Salary (7 months)
Bonus received

10,000.00

2 This figure takes at face value the amount plaintiff claims
in his exhibit as living expenses, less the support paid to
wife (accounted for in her figures), and the monthly payments
to Girrard Bank and GMAC which were not incurred during 1980.

- 9 -
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Sale of Kennecott Stock (R-100)

$ 3,658.00

Total Income for 7 months

$49,824.63

From the above, the following expenses
should be deducted:
Taxes (including $2,500.00
on bonus)
Wife's living expenses

$11,313.00
8,680.00

Husband's living expenses

10,612.00

30,605.00

In substracting the expenses from the income for the first seven
months of 1981, there is an additional $19,219.63 that is missing.
The total amount unaccounted for during this 19 month period
in 1980 and 1981 was $44,680.36.

This is in addition to large

amounts that the plaintiff claims to have borrowed during the
same period and for which he likewise cannot sufficiently account.
Typical of the plaintiff's

explan~tion

for the loss of funds

was the following dialogue taken from page 105 of the record:

"Q:

What about the $10,000.00 dividend that you
received in the spring of this year
(1981)?
What happened to that money?

A:

I just spent it.

Q:

Just blown?

A.

Just blown it."

Only one of two conclusions can be made from the above facts.
3 See discussion of debts beginning on page

13

supra.
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3

Either the husband has spent large sums of money for his own
purposes, or he still has it.

Either way, it should not be

to the prejudice of the wife.
In light of the above, the wife urged the trial court
to award her the first $40,000.00 of assets before making any
further division.

She sought in closing argument the en-

tire proceeds from the sale of the parties' equity in the
condominium of $20,997.81, and the entire amount of the
Kennecott Savings & Investment Plan of $14,209.00, which
were the only two assets of any substantial value.

The Court

found that the husband had not sufficiently and convincingly
accounted for the loss of funds, but nevertheless awarded
defendant only one-half of the Kennecott Savings & Investment Plan.
to her.

The bulk of the remaining assets were awarded

In addition to the problem of the missing funds,

the Court cited the minimal liquid assets available for distribution and huge disparity in the parties' earning capacity
as additional reasons for making an unequal division of
the few remaining assets over which the Court had control.
Throughout the trial, the defendant insisted that he had
only spent $2,000.00 of the marital assets on his girl
friend, Ellen Jensen (R-134).

The Court was not obligated
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to believe this testimony, 4 which was also in direct conFurther, it would be
flict with his own specific figures. 5
irrelevant whether the missing funds were spent on Ellen,
or for any other purpose.
Plaintiff further argues in his brief that he was
awarded a negative property distribution of $13,117.10.

This

is totally absurd, and results from a manipulation and distortion of figures on the part of plaintiff for the purposes
of the trial.

The principal deceptive figure used by plain-

tiff in making his argument is the obligation figure of
$38,271.88 which he claims the Court ordered him to

4 It is the perogative of the trial judge to judge the credibility of witnesses, and in case of conflict the Supreme Court
should assume that the trial court believed the evidence which
supports her findings. Stone v. Stone, 19 Utah 2d 378; 431 P.
2d 802.
5 Expenditures that were acknowledged were as follows: $500.00
per month rent on an apartment for one year (R-132); utilities
in apartment (R-132); pleasure trips to San Francisco and
El Paso costing approximately $4,000.00 (R-136); purchase of
ten speed bike for $115.49 (R-137); purchase of dress for $72.45
(R-137); $650.00 for purchase of meat for Ellen, plaintiff and
Ellen's parents (R-140); $140.00 for a lighter (R-142); cash
spending money in amounts of $300.00, $300.00, $150.00 and
$200.00 (R-145); $50.00 for a portrait (R-144); $650.00 for the
purchase of a dress and robes (R-144); hospital and medical expenses of which the amount was not shown (R-146). All of these
expenses were in the year 1980. Defendant did not go into
specific expenditures for the year 1981, as the plaintiff's
check records for 1981 had not been available prior to trial
(R-148,150).

- 12 -
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assume 6

That figure includes numerous items of highly

questionable validity.
1.

They are as follows:

It includes $12,048.96 as being the balance due on

a new 1981 Pontiac Grand Prix which the plaintiff purchased
approximately one month before the trial (R-95).

A large

portion of the debt is nothing more than future precomputed
interest which has been added to the purchase price (R-99).
Certainly the wife should not be chargeable for this item.
2.

It includes $11,579.75 as the claimed balance owing

to Girrard Bank. Plaintiff's financial statement of September
1, 1980 7 showed a liability to Girrard Bank of only $450.00.
Thus, during the time this action was pending (the complaint
having been filed in June, 1980), the liability to Girrard
Bank increased by $11,139.75.

This amount is not accounted

for by the plaintiff and is in addition to the $44,680.36 in
other income not accounted for as explained on page

10

supra.
3.

It includes $3,968.00 owing to Kennecott Copper Cor-

poration which likewise did not appear in the September 1,
1980 financial statement.

6

Although the plaintiff's explanation

A breakdown of the $38,271.88 figure is shown on Exhibit

2P.
7

See Appendix to Appellant's Brief.
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of this item is somewhat confusing, it appears to be merely
a negative charge against plaintiff's expense account for which
he has not yet submitted his expense vouchers (R-162).
4.

It includes $3,200.00 in attorney's fees owing by

the husband for services in connection with this divorce (R-166).
Since the wife has an equivalent attorney's fee

(~-193)

that is

not shown in plaintiff's exhibit, her distribution would likewise be reduced by a proportionate amount.

The husband was

not ordered by the Court to pay wife's attorney's fees in this
action (R-49).
5.

It includes $1,631.45 owing to First Interstate Bank.

This represents a loss on the purchase and sale of Kennecott
stock (R-160).

This stock was purchased on margin in approxi-

mately September, 1980 without the knowledge or consent of
wife (R-128).

If plaintiff desires to speculate with the assets

of the marriage during the period of time that a divorce is
pending and when contested claims are being made against
marital assets, it should be at his own risk.
6.

It includes an obligation to CitiBank of $1,409.27

which is simply a credit card account that likewise was not in
existence at the time of the September 1, 1980 financial statement.

Nor were the other credit card and department store

accounts in existence at that time.

It also includes Ambassador

Club charges which would reasonably be chargeable to plaintiff's
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expense account.
In addition to the distorted obligation figure used by
the plaintiff in making his argument, there are other disputed
figures that, to a lesser degree, make the property division
more equal than plaintiff would like it to appear.

For example,

the furniture awarded to wife is claimed by plaintiff to have
a value of $7,500.00; however, the wife did not consider it
to be worth that much (R-182) and the Court in its findings did
not attempt to fix any value.

Also, the Paradox stock awarded

to the husband was valued by him at only $3,000.00, when in
fact the actual investment in the stock (most of which was purchased as late as March, 1981 without wife's knowledge or consent) was $5,000.00 (R-151,153).

Also included in the award

to the wife were two paintings that the husband had given to her
as birthday and anniversary presents (R-156).

They were arbi-

trarily valued by husband at $4,000.00, yet they cost $2,650.00
(R-78).
An evaluation of all of the above compels the conclusion
that the Court was fair and equitable in the making of the
property distribution.

If anything, the award favored the hus-

band, as defendant believes that she should have been awarded
the entire Kennecott Savings & Investment Plan of $14,207.00
rather than only one-half of it.
§30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated provides that "when a decree

- 15 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of divorce is made, the Court may make such orders in relation
to the . . . property

as may be equitable".

The Utah Supreme

Court has consistently held that the trial court has considerable
latitude in making a division of property.

It is stated in

English v. English (Utah 1977), 565 P.2d 409, as follows:
"The trial court, in a divorce action, has considerable latitude of discretion in adjusting financial
and property interests. A party appealing therefrom
has the burden to prove there was a misunderstanding
or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial
and prejudicial error; or the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings; or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion''.
See also Berry v. Berry (Utah 1981), 635 P.2d 68, where the
Court states:
"There is no fixed formula which a trial judge must
follow in making a division of properties.
Cox v.
Cox, Utah, 532 P.2d 994 (1975).
It is the prerogative of the court to make whatever disposition of
property it deems fair, equitable and necessary for
the protection and welfare of the parties. Hamilton
v. Hamilton, Utah 562 P.2d 235 (1977).
Its division
will not be disturbed on appeal unless the record
shows that there has been an abuse of discretion.
Jesperson v. Jesperson, Utah 610 P.2d 326 (1980)."
There is nothing in the record of the instant case which
would even remotely show an abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court.

Appellant claims that the trial judge

took a punitive approach, yet there is not a single reference
to any com.~ent made by the trial court, or anything done by
her during the trial to support such a claim.

The trial judge
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did not consider the fault of either party in making the
property division, but based it upon the plaintiff's failure
to account for assets, the minimal assets available for distribution, and the huge disparity between the parties respective earning capacity (R-39,46).

These findings, as in

any case, are entitled to the usual presumptions of credibility.
Appellant has made a point in his brief to the effect
that the property division should be in accordance with the
"community property" laws of the State of Arizona.
no Arizona property in this marriage.

There was

The condominium from

which proceeds were derived was located in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Neither party claimed to be resident of Arizona and in fact
plaintiff testified that he was a bona fide resident of Salt
Lake County, Utah (R-66).

And further, even if Arizona law

were to apply, the Court would still have the power to order
a division and disposition of the community property of the
parties.

Proffit v. Proffit, 105 Ariz. 222; 462 P.2d 391.

In Arizona, the Court is not required to divide the community
property equally, but equitably, and, in making apportionment,
can consider excessive or abnormal expenditures as well as
destruction, concealment or fraudulent disposition of community
property.

Kosidlo v. Kosidlo, 125 Ariz. 32; 607 P.2d 15.

The division of property by the trial court should be
affirmed.
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POINT II
THE AWARD OF ALIMONY BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS FAIR AND EQUITABLE
Respondent has no quarrel with the cases cited in appellant's
brief to the effect that alimony is not intended for the purpose of inflicting punishment.

Indeed, respondent agrees

wholeheartedly with the appellant's leading case of English v.
English (Utah 1977), 565 P.2d 409,

wherein it is stated:

" ... the most important function of alimony is to
provide support for the wife as nearly as possible
at the standard of living she enjoyed during the
marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming
a public charge . . . . (the) criteria considered in
determining a reasonable award for support and maintenance include the financial conditions and needs
of the wife, the ability of the wife to produce a
sufficient income for herself; and the ability of
the husband to provide support".
In English, the Court reduced the alimony award because the evidence clearly showed that with the wife's separate income, she
only needed an additional $1500.00 per month for the support of
the entire family.
In applying the standard announced in English, the trial
court in the instant case made the following findings (R-46):
"6. Defendant has not been employed outside the home
for approximately 35 years and has no degrees, skills,
training or experience of any kind which would permit
her to either earn substantial amounts or to build
any kind of security comparable to plaintiff's before
she reaches retirement age.

7. Def7ndant needs $1800.00 per month in alimony
to provide for her care and support, which amount
is within the ability of plaintiff to pay".
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Evidence in support of the above findings included the testimony of the wife that in order to maintain something close
to her standard of living she would need $1,922.00 per month
(R-181; Exhibit 11-D).

While it is true that some of her

monthly needs were estimated (she never having previously
had the experience of maintaining a separate household) there
was never any serious claim that her estimates were out of line
or not made in good faith.

They were also approximately the

same as the expense figures used by Mr. Stump in showing his
own monthly needs (Exhibit 1-P).
Appellant argues that the alimony is excessive and unfair.
He urges that his "take home" pay, as shown by Exhibit 1-P,
is only $2,679.44 per month, and that it is unreasonable to
award defendant $1,800.00 of that amount.

The problem with

appellant's argument is that the figure he represents as being
"take home" pay is again manipulated and distorted.

To arrive

at said figure, he has deducted the following amounts from
his gross income:
1.

$1,569.83 in federal and state taxes. This is
completely out of line as any alimony payments
can now be deducted from gross income and will
reduce his tax obligation considerably.

2.

$310.00 for contributions to a savings and investment plan. This is strictly voluntary.

3.

$343.00 in FICA, when in fact FICA only applies
to the first $29,000.00 of income.

4.

$17.95 to United Fund voluntary contributions.

- 19 -

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5.

$180.00 in accounts payable to the Credit
Union and to Kennecott, which amounts, if
valid, are of a temporary nature.

Inasmuch as the husband's "take home" figures are entirely
without credibility, the Court should look to the undisputed
gross figures.

The husband's undisputed gross earnings per year,

excluding bonuses, are $62,000.00.

If he pays defendant

$1,800.00 per month (or $21,600.00 per year), it still leaves
him $40,400.00 to live on.
defendant will receive.

This amount is almost double what

The $21,600.00 paid to the wife will

be completely tax deductible by the husband, and each of the
parties can then pay their own taxes on their respective amounts.
Plaintiff, in addition to the $40,400.00, will still have his
$1,000.00 per month expense account, out of which he gets some
benefit, plus the entire amount of his bonuses should he receive
them.
When the above figures are looked upon objectively, it
would appear that if anyone has been short changed, it is the
wife, not the husband.

The plaintiff's income is such that

defendant should not have had her requested alimony cut from
$1,922.00 to $1,800.00 per month.

In any event, the Court's

finding that $1,800.00 per month is within the ability of
plaintiff to pay, is clearly supported by the evidence.
Appellant recites at page 13 of his brief that the trial
court found that the wife was capable of being employed and
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earning $700.00 to $800.00 per month.
lutely false.

This statement is abso-

The husband argued to the trial court that a

reasonable alimony figure would be $700.00 per month.

In com-

menting upon this argument, the Court in its Memorandum Decision
stated that even if defendant were to be able to earn an additional $700.00 to $800.00 per month, the suggested alimony figure
of $700.00 would still be unconscionable under the circumstances
(R-39).

There is no finding anywhere of any ability on the part

of the defendant to earn anything, and the alimony award is
"based upon the present financial circumstances of the parties"
(R-49).
The award of alimony by the trial court should be affirmed.
POINT III
THE AWARD OF ONE-HALF OF VESTED BENEFITS UNDER THE RETIREMENT
PLAN WAS FAIR AND EQUITABLE
One of the assets of the marriage was a fully vested, but
unmatured retirement plan at Kennecott Minerals (Exhibit 4-P;
R-120-122).

The vested rights. under this plan were such that

if plaintiff never worked another day in his life he would be
entitled to receive $1,757.008 per month beginning at retirement
8 Exhibit 4-P showed the vested portion of the retirement plan
to be $1,592.00 per month; however, the exhibit only computed
the benefit as of June 1980. After 6 years (retirement age) the
benefit would be $2,608.00 per month and the monthly benefit was
thus increasing $170.16 per year. In computing the current vested
monthly benefit, the trial court correctly added an additional
year of vesting to the amount shown on Exhibit 4-P, since the
trial took place in August, 1981.
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age of 65; or if he continues to work until age 65, his retirement benefits will increase to $2,608.00 per month.
Inasmuch as the retirement benefits were earned as a part
of plaintiff's employment compensation, and inasmuch as the
entire vested portion had accumulated during the marriage, the
Court awarded one-half of the vested benefits to the wife.

She

will get her portion only if and when the benefits are actually
received.

If the benefits never mature because of the husband's

premature death, she gets nothing.

She gets no part of any

increase in benefits resulting from the husband's continued
employment.

No attempt was made to put a present value on the

retirement benefits, as it was not considered in weighing the
other property distribution; rather it was considered as a
separate item of marital property and divided equally.
The approach taken by the trial court has found support
and approval in many recent cases from other jurisdictions.
Perhaps the leading case is In Re Marriage of Brown (California
1976), 544 P.2d 561.

In a comprehensive opinion, the Court

reasoned that non-vested retirements were property subject to
division in dissolution proceedings; that such benefits are
not gratuities flowing from the employer's beneficence, but
rather part of the consideration earned by the employee, a
form of deferred compensation for services rendered; that the
employee's right to such benefits is a contractual right derived
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from the employment contract; and the fact that such right is
contingent upon future events does not degrade it into a mere
expectancy.

The Court further noted that in recent times pension

benefits have become an increasingly significant part of the
consideration earned by the employee and that in many instances
may be the single most important asset of the marital community,
and that a property division which excludes this important asset
from consideration would be highly inequitable.

In determining

the way in which pension benefits should be divided, the Court
then stated as follows:
"In dividing nonvested pension rights as community
property, the court must take account of the possibility that death or termination of employment may
destroy those rights before they mature.
In some
cases, the trial court may be able to evaluate this
risk in determining the present value of those
rights.
(Authorities cited).
But if the Court concludes that because of uncertainties affecting the vesting or maturation of
the pension that it should not attempt to divide
the present value of pension rights, it can instead
award each spouse an appropriate portion of each
pension payment as it is paid.
This method of dividing
the community interest in the pension renders it unnecessary for the Court to compute the present value
of the pension rights, and divides equally the risk
that the pension will fail to vest.
(Authorities cited)."
Another leading case taking the above approach is In Re Marriage
of Hunt (Ill. 1979), 397 N.E.2d 511.

In quoting in part from

Brown, supra, the Illinois Court states as follows:
"In those instances where it is difficult to place
a present value on the pension or profit sharing

- 23 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

interests due to uncertainties regarding vesting or maturation, or when the present value can
be ascertained by the type, or lack, of other marital property makes it impractical or impossible
to award sufficient offsetting marital property
to the non-employee spouse, then the trial court in
its discretion may award each spouse an appropriate
percentage of the pension paid 'if, as and when'
the pension becomes payable.
(Authorities cited).
The marital interest in each payment will be a
fraction of that payment, the numerator of the
fraction being the number of years (or months) of
marriage during which benefits were being accumulated, the denominator being the total number of
years (or months) during which benefits were
accumulated prior to when paid. The trial court,
when using this method of allocation, will retain
jurisdiction and award the non-employee spouse some
percentage of the marital interest in each payment.
(Authorities cited).
Placing a present value on a non-vested pension or
profit sharing interest requires a court to take into
account the possibility that death or termination of
employment may destroy the interest. Thus, this
second method of allocating the interest seems particularly appropriate if the interest has not vested,
because it 'divides the risk that the pension will
fail to vest' ".
Other courts adopting the "if, as and when" approach are Weir
v. Weir (N.J. 1980), 413 A.2d 638; Cearley v. Cearley (Texas
1976) 544 S.W.2d 661; Shill v. Shill (Idaho 1979) 599 P.2d
1004.

See also In Re Marriage of Tjernlund (Ore. 1976), 557

P.2d 61, affirming award to wife of $100.00 per month from
retirement funds of husband if he chooses to receive monthly
benefits, or a lump sum of a stated amount should he choose
a lump sum distribution of his retirement account.
Appellant has urged that the disposition of the vested
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retirement benefits is in direct conflict with the pronouncement of this Court in Bennett v. Bennett (Utah 1980), 607 P.2d
841.

Bennett was a three to two decision involving one member

of the present court on each side of the decision.

It held

that under the circumstances of that case, a government retirement fund of the husband having no present value could not be
considered as an asset of the marriage.
Respondent isn't quite sure how far the holding in Bennett
was meant to apply, or how it is to be reconciled with other
Utah cases. 9

If it is construed narrowly to mean that the court

should not attempt to place a value and use said value as a
significant predicate in the division of other assets, then it
can be easily distinguished.

If on the other hand, it means that

an unmatured vested plan cannot under any circumstances be considered as an asset of the marriage for distribution, then it is
patently unfair, contrary to reality, inconsistent with the case
law generally, and should be overruled.
In the case at hand, the vested retirement benefit has been
accumulating for some 35 years.

During this period, the marriage

has been operating as a partnership with each of the marriage
9 Two cases prior to Bennett held that retirement plans were
properly taken into consideration in the dividing of marital
assets.
Englert v. Englert (Utah 1978), 576 P.2d 1274; Ehninger
v. Ehninger (Utah 1977), 579 P.2d 1104.
In a post Bennett case,
Fletcher v. Fletcher (Utah 1980), 615 P.2d 1218, the court considered retirement benefits, although the exact nature of the
retirement plan was not explained in the opinion.
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partners assuming different roles.

The husband's role has

been that of a bread winner on the job.
been in the home. 1 0

The wife's role has

Is the court now going to exercise its

wisdom as to which of these respective contributions is the
most valuable?

And, unless the court does so, is there any

rhyme or reason as to why the accumulated employment benefits
should not belong equally to the two marriage partners?

To

simply say that the benefits have no present worth is a fiction
of the greatest magnitude, and would work a great injustice upon
the wife.

It is true that the present worth may be difficult

to determine, but there is no reason to even determine the
exact value where the court makes an equal division as it did
here.
In the recent case of Robert C.S. v. Barbara J.S. (Del. 1981)
434 A.2d 383, the court in a well reasoned decision noted that
the trend in the law was to reject any distinction between pension benefits on the basis of vesting.
Linson (Hawaii 1980) 618 P.2d 748.

See also Linson v.

In the instant case, the

Court doesn't have to go that far, as the pension benefits
awarded by the trial court were 100% vested.

The division of

the vested retirement benefits should be affirmed.
lO It may be argued from common knowledge that this role
may be much more difficult and time consuming where a family
is involved. We have grown up with the expression: "A man
works from sun to sun but a woman's work is never done".
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POINT IV
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
Because of the fact that the wife was awarded cash assets,
the trial court concluded that she should pay her own attorney's
fees (R-48).

This finding, however, was only intended to

apply to the trial in the District Court and does not extend to
the appeal.

Inasmuch as respondent has now been required to

defend an unmeritorious appeal, she should be awarded attorney's
fees for the appeal.
In Fletcher v. Fletcher, (Utah 1980) 615 P.2d 1218, the
Court held that in a divorce case, there are a number of factors
to be considered in determining whether attorney's fees should
be awarded on appeal, and that the issue of attorney's fees
should be remanded to the trial court for determination as to
whether an award should be made, and if so, the amount thereof.
There is no necessity to file a cross appeal in order to
be awarded attorney's fees on appeal.

Coates v. American Economy

Insurance·company (Utah 1981), 627 P.2d 92.
The matter of attorney's fees should be remanded to the
trial court for determination.
CONCLUSION
There is no evidence whatsoever that the trial court made
any punitive considerations whatsoever in the fashioning of the
decree.

The decree was fair and equitable, and if anything,
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favored the husband.
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed and
the matter remanded solely for the purpose of fixing the
attorney's fee to be awarded respondent on appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS,
WEST & BROWN
David E. West
1300 Walker Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent
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Nov # l

William Bailey Stump,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

Bench Memorandum
No. 18036

Bo11eta Lou Stump,
Defendant and Respondent.

**********
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
Following entry of a divorce decree, husband challenges the property distribution of the marital estate and the
award of alimony.
ISSUES:
1.

Was the division of property equitable?

2.

Given the needs of the wife and the earning of

the husband, was the alimony award equitable?

(Husband seeks

to reduce the $1800/month award to $900/month.)
3.

Did the court properly consider and divide hus-

band's retirement benefits?
4.

Is wife entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
The parties were married in Phoenix, Arizona in 1946.
The parties had four children, all of whom have reached majority.
Husband has worked for Kennecott since shortly after the marriage
and for the past 10 years has been controller of the company.
In February, 1980, husband was transferred from Arizona to Utah.
Wife remained in Arizona until June, 1980, at which time the
family home was sold.

The proceeds of that sale were used to

purchase a condominium in Utah that summer (1980).
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It appears that during the period the parties were
separated, husband found himself a girlfriend,
and the parties filed for divorce.

{Ellen Jensen)

In September, 1980, wife

obtained an order for temporary support whereby husband was
required to pay a total of $1240/month (including condo payments).
Pending trial of the divorce action the condominium was sold,
netting the parties $20,997e81, which was held in escrow.
At trial {in August, 1981) it was established that
husband's salary was $62,000 per year.

He also usually received

bonuses {$6,000 in 1979, $10,000 in 1980), although that depended
on corporate profits.
and other benefits.

He has an expense account with the company
Wife is not presently employed and has no

special job skills.
Husband claims expenses of $2,457/month while wife
claims $1,922/month.

There is evidence that during the pending

divorce, husband lavished gifts upon Ellen Jensen, although he
disputes it.

The court found that husband had "dissipated assets

for his own purposes and has generally made no attempt to preserve
the marital assets for distribution."

The court therefore awarded

most of the assets to the wife as follows:

{Please continue to next page.)
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Husband

Wife
295.64

$

cash . . . •

. .

*Tax Refund.

658.55

$

3,000.00

*Cash from Condo

.

20,997.81

1981 Pontiac

9,325.44

*Stock (Asarco) .

.

2,031.25

Mortgage
Differential

316.80

Insurance Rebate

163.40

Stock (Paradox) .

.

19 77 Chrysler
Furniture
Paintings

Note Receivable

2,700.00

Furniture

2,250.00

1/2 Kennecott
Savings
. . .

Note:

.

3,675.00

.
.

*1/2 Kennecott
Savings

7,500.00
4,000.00

. . . . . . .

7,103.50

7,103.00

.

The items marked "*" are those which husband says should be
awarded to him.

The court

o~dered

that husband was to be liable for approxi-

mately $38,000 in debts, most of which were incurred separately
by him.

The court also awarded wife alimony in the amount of

$1,800/month plus one-half of husband's vested retirement benefits when husband reaches age 65 ($875/month).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS:
1.

Property
Husband first says that most of the marital assets

were acquired in Arizona (a community property state) and that
an equal division is the only equitable division.
or most of the items marked

*

He seeks all

above, claiming that any other

division constitutes an abuse of discretion, particularly when
he is strapped with all of the debt.

He concedes that the divi-

sion was·made because the court found that he had dissipated the
assets, but claims that there is no basis in the evidence for
such finding.
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Wife points out that there was a large amount
of cash under husband's control which was never accounted for.
She does this by totalling his expenses, her expenses, and
taxes and subtracts these total expenses from total income.
She says the discrepancy in 1980 was $25,460 and in 1981
$19,219.

She alleges that either husband still has the money

or he spent it for his own purposes.

The trial judge obviously

bought that argument when she found "he has had control of substantial funds which he has used at his discretion and has not
sufficiently or convincingly accounted for said funds.''

Hus-

band concedes that he spent $2,000 on his girlfriend, but there
is evidence that he spent much more.
Both parties cite cases to establish what constitutes an abuse of discretion in the division of marital property.
Husband says there is obvious bias here and that in such a case
the appellate court may interpose its own judgment.
v. Jorgenson, Utah, 599 P.2d 510 (1979).

Jorgenson

Wife says that there

is evidence to support what the trial court did and therefore
this Court will be hard-pressed to upset the award.
v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409

See English

(1977) and Berry v. Berry, Utah

635 P.2d 68 (19811.
2.

Alimony
The parties seem to agree that alimony is to be

based on the needs of the wife and the ability of the husband
to pay.

See English v. English, supra.

Husband says that this

standard was not employed, but rather the trial court is trying
to punish him.

Based on monthly take home pay of $2,679.44,
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husband says he will get $1,779 and she will get $2,500 after
adjustments are made for taxes and her potential employment .
. He says that when matched against respective projected expenses!
she will have a surplus and he a deficit.

He wants the award

reduced to $900.
Wife points out that the trial court made specific
findings as to the elements required in English for a support
award.

She says husband has manipulated the figures.

She says

that using $62,000/year as a basis, she will get $21,600 gross
and he will get $40,400 gross.

She also says that the award

is based on the present circumstances arid that at present, she
has no employment.
3.

Retirement Benefits
One exhibit showed that if husband were to retire.

in June 1980 he would be entitled to $1,592 per month, effective
on his 65th birthday.

If husband were to work 6 more years

(until. he was 65), the monthly benefit would. be $2,608.00.

The

trial court extrapolated and held that as of the date of the
decree, husband's vested retirement was $1,757.00 per month.
The court ordered that when (and if) husband retires, wife is
entitled to half of his vested retirement as of the date of the
divorce, or about $875.
Husband says that this is contrary to Bennett v.
Bennett, Utah, 607 P.2d 841 (1980) in that the benefits had no
present value.

Wife seems to agree that Bennett might be subject

to that interpretation and if so, Bennett should be overruled.
She says that alternatively Bennett may be narrowly construed to
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mean that an estimate of retirement benefit value may not be
used in the division of other assets.

(She cites here Englert

v. Englert, Utah, 576 P.2d 1274 (1978) .}

She contends that she

has worked just as hard as husband for the retirement benefits
and that i t would be unfair to deny them to her.
eral other jurisdictions.)

(Citing sev-

She points out that she will get

her share only "if and when" husband reaches the age of 65 and
starts to draw retirement benefits.

4e

Attorney Fees
Wife says that although she was required to pay

her own fees below, she is entitled to them on appeal because
she has been required to defend an "unmeritorious appeal.".
See Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615 P.2d 1218 (1980).
RECOMMENDATION:
The Court will have to decide whether there has
been an abuse of discretion in the alimony and property awards.
As to the retirement benefits, other cases this Court has decided may be of little help, because here they have been treated
separate from other property.

There is no merit for the claim

for attorney fees.
QUESTIONS:
None.
###
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